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COMMENTS REGARDING RESPONDENT'S 
"STATEMENT OF CASE" 
The mother has set forth in her "Statement of Case" 
several "facts" which are inappropriate to present to this 
Court. The Rules of this Court require that the facts from the 
record be set forth with appropriate citations to the record. 
Rule 24 (a) (7) , (b) , (c) , R. Utah Ct. App. 
The father appealed a decision District Judge Young 
rendered as a matter of law: that a husband may not, regardless 
of his claims, be awarded an injunction preventing his wife from 
aborting their common child. See Order Denying Injunctive 
Relief, dated May 31, 1988. Since the ruling was as a matter 
of law, the unresolved factual claims of the two sides have 
little or no relevance. 
The important facts are agreed upon (see complaint and 
answer; R. 2-7, 14-22): 
1. The parties are married (seeking a divorce). 
2. The parties are parents of one young child. 
3. The parties conceived a second time. 
4. The mother desired to abort this second child, since 
she is young and did not feel ready for a second baby. 
5. The father desired to raise both children. 
Nevertheless, the mother has throughout her brief and 
particulary in her "Statement of the Case" recited in a way most 
VI. 
favorable to herself (as respondent), what she believes to have 
been the facts. In many instances she has set forth "facts" 
without citation to the record/ often knowing they were clearly 
in dispute. At no time has an evidenciary hearing been held in 
this matter and no Findings of Fact have been made, since the 
ruling below was as a matter of law. 
For example, the mother asserts without citation to 
anything that it was "not until after the defendant left the 
plaintiff, as a result of his extramarital affairs, that 
plaintiff objected to the scheduled abortion." Brief p. 2. The 
mother is acutely aware that these facts were not presented to 
the court for decision, are denied by the father and are hotly 
disputed between the parties. It is worse than inappropriate 
to make such an assertion in a brief for this Court to rely 
upon, as if it were factual. 
The mother also uses considerable space explaining her 
assertions in the divorce proceedings which are still pending in 
the court below. See, e.g., Brief pp. 4-6. These factual 
assertions are also irrelevant, since the case has been 
certified for appeal and bifurcated, and the divorce issues have 
nothing to do with whether a father has a right to be heard with 
regard to the termination of the unborn he has sired. 
Pages five and six of the mother's brief recite what she 
apparently claims to be a procedural history of the case. 
However, those pages contain no citations to the record and are 
vii. 
likewise irrelevant to the issues on appeal. Besides wasting 
the Court's time, these discussions are misleading. For 
example, the mother claims (Brief pp. 5-6) that plaintiff 
"objected to the Commissioner's recommendation that he pay his 
share of the child custody evaluation". If the mother has 
studied the file or recalls the proceeding she is aware that the 
objection was only to the commissioner's order that the father 
pay the entire cost of the evaluation. This objection succeeded 
in causing Judge Young to order the mother to pay her third. 
See, Order on Order to Show Cause, exhibit G to Respondent's Brief. 
It is particulary inappropriate for the mother to allege 
(Brief pp. 6-7; 26-28) that the father has been "consistently 
late" in paying his support since entry of the judgment, etc. 
The details involved which are in dispute, are again irrelevant 
to this appeal, and are not a part of the record. 
The father feels that such abuse of the facts and 
misleading of the Court are wholly inappropriate, and therefore 
moves to strike the Brief of respondent, or at least pages 3 
through 7 and 26 through 28 thereof, together with Exhibits G 
and B. 
viii. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The mother's brief may be disregarded in whole or in part, 
since it is grounded upon an improper use of facts outside the 
record, misstates facts and fails to cite to the record. 
It is the mother, not the father, who seeks an exclusive, 
nonreviewable veto power over her mate in the abortion decision. 
The rights of the parties are both private or both involve state 
action, making balancing appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The mother's brief should be disregarded. 
As pointed out in the foregoing comments, the mother's 
response brief contains factual inaccuracies, recites "facts" 
which are not in the record, and fails to cite to the record. 
Rule 24(a)(7) and (b) requires stated facts to be supported by 
citations to the record. And the facts used must be "relevant to 
the issues presented for review." R. Utah Ct. App. 24(a)(7) and 
(b). See also R. Utah Ct. App. 24(e). 
Many of the facts used by the mother which, though 
disputed, actually do appear in the trial court's file are from 
documents submitted and proceedings held after the matter was 
certified for appeal, bifurcated and appealed. 
The record in a case where there is not a transcript 
consists of documents "filed in the court from which the appeal 
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is taken." R. Utah Ct. App. 11(a). The father believes this 
could not include documents and proceedings in the divorce 
portion of the case occurring in the trial court after this Court 
had taken jurisdiction over the abortion issues. The advisory 
committee, in drafting the comparable rule for the Utah Supreme 
Court, noted that the court may rely on any material contained in 
the "district court's original file." Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 
11(a), R. Utah S. Ct. (emphasis supplied). 
The Supreme Court's notes for Rule 24(a)(7) point out that 
the prior rule had a similar requirement for use of the record, 
but the new rule was for emphasis, as the old one was often 
disregarded. Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 24(a)(7), R. Utah S. Ct. 
Briefs may not contain burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial 
or scandalous matters. R. Utah Ct. App. 24 (k). The response 
brief appears to violate this restriction, since it contains 
several pages of inaccurate, irrelevant and somewhat inflamatory 
factual narrative. Briefs not in compliance with Rule 24 may be 
disregarded or stricken on motion or sua sponte, and the court 
may assess attorney fees against the offending draftsman. Id.; 
see also R. Utah Ct. App. 40(b) [sanction for failure to comply 
with rules]. The father requests such action under that rule as 
the Court deems appropriate. 
The Court recently warned that Rule 24!s penalties of 
attorney fees or disregarding or striking a brief are real. 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 961, 962, 82 Utah Adv. 
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Rep. 26, 27 (Utah App. 1988); Dirks v. Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 
947, 948, 81 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah App. 1988). 
The courts have often lamented the use of facts alleged 
but not supported by the record on appeal, and will not consider 
irrelevant material. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1983), cert. den. 460 
U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443; 75 L.Ed.2d 799 (1983). "Appellant 
makes many immaterial factual allegations that are not supported 
by the record and has failed to cite those portions of the record 
that do support the material facts. . . . This Court need not, 
and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or 
supported by the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life 
Ins., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
II. The mother continues to confuse the issue. 
It appears to the father that the two briefs filed to date 
are to a large extent arguing opposite sides of different issues. 
The father asks that his rights in his procreation be recognized, 
and defined, and, when properly and speedily asserted, balanced 
against the mother's desire to terminate the procreative right 
for both parents. The mother continues to argue against a veto 
power by the father over his wife's choice. See, e.g., Resp. 
Brief Points I, II and V; Summary of Arguments, Brief pp. 7-10, 
13, etc. 
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For example, both parties have referred to Wolfe v. 
Schroering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1978). App. Brief p. 3; Resp. 
Brief p. 12-13. The mother seems to use Wolfe, like most of her 
other authorities, to show that somehow the father's balancing of 
rights suggestion is prohibited by the Supreme Court's rejection 
of a spousal veto. Resp. Brief p. 12-13. The mother makes the 
same mistake with Judge Ritter's decision in Doe v. Rampton, 366 
F.Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), App. Brief p. 14. 
In deciding this case, the father suggests that the Court 
ignore all arguments as to why husbands should not be allowed an 
absolute, nonreviewable control of their mate's abortion options. 
It is the mother, not the father, who seeks an absolute veto—the 
right to decide whether the fetus develops or dies—without 
being inconvenienced by input from the husband-father. 
III. Danforth does not control this case. 
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 797 (1975), discussed in the father's 
prior brief, does not determine the outcome in this case as the 
mother believes. In fact, to hold that under no circumstances 
may the husband enjoin abortion of his unborn child would be to 
extend Danforth beyond its limits. Danforth condemned absolutes. 
Such an effectively absolute wife veto of the husband's voice 
would actually be contrary to the spirit of Danforth. 
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The Supreme Court has itself stressed the limited coverage 
of Danforth. "In Danforth we struck down state statutes that 
imposed a requirement of prior written consent of the patient's 
spouse and of a minor patient's parents as a prerequisite to an 
abortion." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 
1170, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981). 
In Matheson a minor sought to overturn the Utah statute 
requiring abortionists to notify, if possible, parents of the 
minor before performing her requested abortion. § 76-7-304, Utah 
Code Anno. (1974). The mandate comes from a phrase in the same 
statutory sentence that requires the physician to notify, if 
possible, the spouse if the woman is married. Parental 
notification, the only provision at issue, was upheld. 450 U.S. 
at 1173. Relying on Danforth and other abortion decisions upon 
which the mother here relies, the Utah Supreme Court had also 
upheld the statute, affirming Judge Winder. H.L. v. Matheson, 
604 P.2d 907 (1979) . 
The Matheson minor alleged that her right to privacy would 
be violated by having to notify her parents, also attempting to 
rely on Danforth. But the Supreme Court pointed out that 
Danforth held merely that a state may not give "an absolute, 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision . . . to terminate the 
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the 
consent." 450 U.S. at 408 quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
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The court noted that the Bellotti decisions also dealt 
with absolutes. 450 U.S. at 408, 409, citing Bellotti v. Baird, 
428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976) (Bellotti I); 
and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 
797 (1979) (Bellotti II)[where four justices felt the defect in 
statute was absolute veto, failing to allow judicial deter-
mination that particular minor is mature and should not have to 
notify parents]. 
But the Matheson provision was acceptable, since "It]he 
Utah statute gives neither parents nor judges a veto power over 
the minor's abortion decision." 450 U.S. at 411. So Danforth 
and its progeny hold only that as between a blanket veto by the 
father (or parent), and the woman's right to abort, the latter 
prevails. 
Not only does Danforth deal with absolute veto, it also 
adjudicates the rights of a mere husband, who may or may not be 
the father. The opinion noted, "In Roe and Doe we specifically 
reserved decision on the question whether a requirement for 
consent by the father of the fetus, by the spouse, or by the 
parents, or a parent, of an unmarried minor, may be consti-
tutionally imposed." 405 U.S. at 69. Of these questions, 
Danforth decided only one: may the state delegate to all spouses 
an absolute veto in every case. The Matheson case later decided 
parental notification was an acceptable requirement, again 
disallowing a blanket veto. 
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And in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 
490-493 (1983) a requirement of parental or judicial consent was 
upheld for unmarried minors. The structure was acceptable since 
parents have power over their minor children. The statute did 
not "give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto 
. . . regardless of the reason for withholding the consent," 
since a court could waive the lack of consent on a case by case 
basis. Id. at 643. Without saying so, this seems to approve a 
balancing of sorts of parents1 and minor child's interests. This 
case presents an opportunity to determine the issue of a 
balancing of parental versus personal interests. 
The father's rights here are perhaps more compelling than 
a parent's right to give or withhold consent to abortion (subject 
to a court waving consent in a given case). He seeks to prevent 
permanent extinguishment of his constitutional rights, rather 
than to merely influence a minor child's decision. 
Danforth is not controlling, since the invalidation of the 
Missouri spousal consent law was based on the premise that the 
state could not delegate that which it did not have. Danforth at 
69. The interests of a father in his children do not derive from 
the state. If they did the state could arbitrarily curtail those 
rights, something the state is not permitted to do. Santoskey v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972). The line of United States Supreme Court abortion cases 
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all involve state statutes. 
The mother has argued that distinguishing the father's 
balancing suggestion from an absolute veto is "a distinction 
without a difference." Brief p. 11. This is true, she contends, 
because the balance may result in overcoming her will, and "a 
veto is a veto." Id. This is analogous to saying that because a 
father may win custody at trial, allowing him the trial is 
tantamount to robbing her of the right to her children, since the 
outcome could be the same. The Matheson dissent took a similar 
stance, equating notice with allowing a veto (Marshall, joined by 
Blackmun and Brennan) . The majority rejected the attempt. 450 
U.S. at 411 n. 17. 
Neither Danforth nor Matheson, nor any other decision 
controlling this Court, has considered the father's rights under 
the circumstances of this case. 
IV. The father's rights are as "private" as the mother's. 
By reasoning which defies logic, the mother has asserted 
that her right to abort is purely "private" while his rights as a 
father are "state action." This inaccurate catagorization is 
convenient for the mother. Casting the father's right to see his 
child born as state action lets pro-choice decisions apply the 
constitutional right to privacy. And if the mother can hide her 
desire to abort behind the "private rights" label, the Court may 
ignore the fundamental rights of the father to procreate and 
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raise children. Brief p. 15-16. 
The mother has made the distinction based upon the fact 
that the father here resorted to the trial court to weigh the 
respective rights. Of course the parties1 rights were first 
asserted in private discussions. But whenever someone's exercise 
of private rights is infringed upon, his or her options are to 
give in, use self help or resort to the courts. Here when an 
impasse arose, the mother attempted self help by planning an 
abortion, and the father went to court. Had he resorted to self 
help to prevent the abortion, the mother would have been the one 
in court seeking an injunction. 
The father believes both parents1 rights are private, 
regardless of who wins the race to the courthouse or, who has the 
physical ability to subordinate her spouse's will to her own. 
V. No state action is involved. 
Even the pro-choice dissent by Justice Marshall stated 
that the abortion right must be free of unwarranted state action. 
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 1170, 67 
L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), Marshall, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan, 
J. and Blackmun, J. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter 
alia: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; no shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty , or property, without due 
- 9 -
process of law; nor deny to any persons within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
Clearly there can be no violation unless state action is 
involved. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol 1 § 8:1. All 
the Supreme Court cases cited by the mother are attacks on state 
statutes, where state action is unquestioned. They do not 
apply to this case. 
State action does not necessarily exist simply because the 
courts are resorted to for enforcement of private rights. See, 
e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 634, 90 S.Ct. 
628. State action in fathers1 rights cases usually is found when 
the rights are defined by statute. Swayne v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. Sept. 15, 1988). 
In the case of Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. 
Advocates for Life, Inc., abortion advocates brought a civil 
rights action against abortion opponents, claiming they had 
disrupted their abortion business, and intimidated and harassed 
patients. 681 F.Supp. 688 (D.Or. 1988). The court found that to 
be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), plaintiffs would need to 
prove violation of their right to privacy (abortion rights) under 
the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, as defined by Roe v. 
Wade and its progeny. 681 F.Supp. at 691. The court stated: 
This right to personal privacy is founded upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
and its restrictions upon state action. . . . The 
recognition of a constitutional right to privacy 
guarantees to women the right to make certain 
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fundamental intimate choices without governmental 
interference. . . . It does notf however, protect 
that right from private interference. . • . 
Id. (citations only omitted, emphasis supplied). In that case no 
state action was found, since the actions of defendants were 
private, and not dependent upon a state statute. 
A similar case was Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. 
Butte Glenn Medical Society, 557 F.Supp. 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983). 
Chico, an abortion clinic, brought a claim against the only local 
hospital and others under the same civil rights statute as was 
used in Portland. Part of the claim was that since the actions 
of defendants made performing abortions more difficult and 
expensive there was a right to privacy infringement. The court 
held that state action must be shown, not merely interference by 
a private party. Where the only facts showing state action were 
the hospital's receipt of state funds and its local monopoly, no 
state action was found. 557 F.Supp. at 1197. 
Danforth (428 U.S. at 69) held that since the state cannot 
proscribe abortion, it cannot delegate the authority to do so to 
any particular person, even the spouse. But by the Court simply 
recognizing that the husband has, independent of the state, an 
interest of his own in the life of the fetus which should not be 
extinguished by the unilateral decision of his wife, the state 
delegates nothing. 
It by no means follows, from the fact that the 
mother's interest in deciding 'whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy' outweighs the State's 
interest in the potential life of the fetus, that 
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the husband's interest is also outweighed and may 
not be protected by the State. A father's interest 
in having a child . . . may be unmatched by any 
other interest in his life. 
Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 960 (Ind. 1988), Pivarnik, J. 
dissenting, cert. den. 109 S.Ct. 391 (1988). 
The whole concept of the Supreme Court's abortion 
cases is one of "zones of privacy" into which the 
state may not enter. See, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 153, 35 L Ed 2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727 (1973);. 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 756, 35 
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). It is simplistic to a fault to 
assume the father of the unborn child (who is also 
husband) stands in the same position as the state, 
in the life or death decision. 
In each [abortion] case the right of privacy was but 
the correlative of the duty of the State to refrain 
from activity to which, by virtue of the limited 
nature of our constitutional government, it was 
obliged to remain a stranger. But who will assert 
that the husband here is, or could ever be, a 
stranger to the destruction of the fetus which he 
begot or the possible future birth of his child. . . 
. [A] father's rights in the birth of a child cannot 
be dissolved unreasoned reference to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 136 (Mass. 1974). Reardon, J. 
dissenting. It is not unusual for a court to enforce private 
rights which are denied to the state. See, Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). 
VI. Plaintiff's fundamental rights are threatened. 
The mother coldly states, "it is up to the plaintiff, not 
the courts, to find someone willing to bear plaintiff's child." 
Brief p. 17. Of course the father's child here will never be 
born. Another opportunity to procreate could arise, but never 
as to the child destroyed by the mother's actions. 
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The father has not sought help from the courts or anyone 
else to "find someone to bear his offspring." The mother 
consensually committed the acts necessary to conceive this child. 
See, C.S. v. Nielson, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah App. Dec. 6, 
1988) ["Clearly [a] person's decision not to conceive a child and 
to undergo surgical sterilization should not be confused with 
one's decision to abort a child already conceived."] (emphasis in 
original, citation omitted). The impassioned arguments she has 
made concerning forced contraception, compelling a woman to do 
the acts necessary to become pregnant, etc., should be 
disregarded. See, e.g. Brief pp. 17-18, 25-26. 
Despite what the mother argues, a father's fundamental 
rights in his children are directly involved in the abortion 
dispute. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Mass. 1974). 
Hennessey, J. dissenting. The father cited several pages of Utah 
and United States Supreme Court cases on a father's rights in his 
opening brief, and they will not be repeated here. As in Doe, "a 
substantial, indeed precious interest of the husband has been 
extinguished." Id. at 135, Reardon, J. dissenting. Justice 
Henessey summarized his feelings about the case, which illustrate 
its similarity to this one: 
The father's rights asserted here are surely 
among the fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution. 
In the circumstances of the case before us, the 
father's rights were dominant. The woman's health 
was not a factor. She had separated from her 
husband and did not want the child because she 
doubted her ability to care for the child and 
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because she said her husband had indicated to her 
that he would not support it. The husband wanted 
the pregnancy to continue to full term and a normal 
birth. He stated he would be willing to assume 
custody, and care for the child, in the event that 
the wife would not. The wife's assertions were not 
supportable by contrast with those of her husband. 
Thus, justice to her husband, at the very least, 
required forbearance by the wife. 
Id. at 134. 
The Doe majority, whose ruling is not controlling in Utah, 
felt obliged to rule in favor of a mother's unfettered right to 
abortion. The father believes this Court would do better to 
follow the better reasoned dissents. 
The problem for the mother is, in part, the attitude 
expressed in her brief that she considers the father a "third 
party" who should not interfere. Brief p. 11, 11 2. Hopefully no 
court would take such an attitude. 
The father's rights are fundamental, and any attempt to 
overcome them is viewed by the courts with "strict scrutiny." 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 
S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed.2d 1655 (1942). It would be absurd to 
suggest this interest springs into existence, fully bloomed, on 
the day of birth. As for the mother, the gestation period is 
for the father a time of anxiety, anticipation, and increase in 
feeling for the unborn child. See, generally, Spock, Baby and 
Child Care, pp. 28031 (Revised Pocket Book ed. 1968); Poe v. 
Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (1975); Jones v. Smith, 474 F.Supp. 1160, 
1168 (1979). 
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A Florida husband consent statute was rejected because 
(like Danforth) it allowed withholding of consent "for any reason 
or no reason at all." Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F.Supp. 695, 698 
(S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 517 F.2d 787. cert, den., 417 U.S. 279, 
afffd (as to denial of injunctive relief), 417 U.S. 281 (1974). 
But the court wrote that interests (like fathers1) which arise at 
the moment of conception, and are outside the categories of 
protection of maternal health and potential life, would not be 
controlled by Roe v. Wade and its progeny, and would withstand 
constitutional attack. 376 F.Supp. at 697-698. 
We recognize that the interest of the husband in 
the embryo or fetus carried by his wife, especially 
if he is the father, is qualitatively different from 
the interest which the mother may have in her health 
and the interest of the viable fetus in its 
potential life. The interest which a husband has in 
seeing his procreation carried full term is, 
perhaps, at least equal to that of the mother. The 
biological bifurcation of the sexes, which dictates 
that the female alone carry the procreation of the 
two sexes, should not necessarily foreclose the 
active participation of the male in decisions 
relating to whether their mutual creation should be 
aborted or allowed to prosper. It may be that the 
husband's interest in this mutual procreation 
attaches at the moment of conception. 
VII. The balancing approach is less restrictive than a veto. 
It appears there are a couple of concepts upon which both 
parties to this action can agree: 
1. Under Danforth an absolute veto is not allowed. 
2. The father has rights in his offspring and to 
procreate, though the effect of those rights on this case are 
disputed. 
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The balancing approach suggested by the father addresses 
these two problems, allowing involvement and a possibility of 
winning an injunction preserving the unborn child, while falling 
short of the absolute veto. 
The court in Jones v. Smith, 474 F.Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 
1979) was faced with a Florida statute requiring notification and 
consultation with the husband before an abortion could be 
performed. The court upheld the statute, noting that Danforth 
would not apply, since something less than a veto power was given 
to the husband. 474 F.Supp. at 1167. Like Danforth (428 U.S. at 
69), Jones recognized the deep and proper concern and interest a 
devoted husband or father might have. 474 F.Supp. at 1168. And 
Jones agreed with Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (1975) that the 
state has an interest in protecting the rights of a pregnant 
woman's husband. 474 F.Supp. at 1168. 
Jones found the statute was an appropriate promotion of 
the state's interest in protecting the husband's rights and 
fostering the marital relationship, without the constitutional 
infirmity that exists when the husband is given an absolute veto. 
Id. 
Where a court is faced with a less restrictive attempt to 
protect a father's rights, as here, it may recognize the rights 
asserted. 
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VIII. The balancing approach is not unworkable. 
The mother's arguments against the balancing approach are 
for the most part more examples of inappropriate and misleading 
use of facts not in the record/ devoid of attempts to cite to 
the record. See, e.g. Brief pp. 27-28. And it approaches 
scandalous for the mother to state that his desire to enjoin the 
abortion "was more likely based on his wish to harass the 
defendant than his wish to take on the responsibilities of 
fatherhood." Brief pp. 27-28. On what can she base such an 
assumption? It is not only inappropriate—it is belied by these 
proceedings. 
The mother makes the point that had the court below 
weighed the interest, she believes she would have prevailed 
anyway. Brief p. 28. This is an argument for, rather than 
against, a balancing approach. 
The mother states that if the trial court had ruled in 
favor of the father, she would be faced with the "difficult 
decision of placing for adoption the child she has born or 
rearing the child with insufficient resources." Brief p. 28. 
Such a comment, apparantly presuming automatic custody in the 
mother, illustrates the gender bias on which the mother's claim 
rests. How can she assume the decision would be hers? How can 
she assume care of the child would be awarded to the mother that 
wished it not to be born? 
The argument (Brief pp. 27-28) that the judicial reduction 
of support (due to the father's loss of employment) or alleged 
late payments illustrate why he should not prevail are likewise 
flawed with bigotry. To base a father's rights on financial 
ability has never been appropriate, and would surely be met with 
a lawsuit by the mother's supporters if such criteria were used 
by a court or statute to terminate parental rights or deny 
custody. 
IX. A balancing approach can be effective. 
From its inception the abortion right has been regarded 
not as absolute, but as an interest to be weighed and balanced 
against other important interests. For example, after finding 
abortion within the right of privacy, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the 
Roe v. Wade court wrote: 
[Slome argue that the woman's right is absolute and 
that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at 
whatsoever time, in whatever way, and for whatever 
reason she alone chooses. With this we do not 
agree. . . . In fact, it is not clear to us that the 
claim asserted by some . . . that one has an 
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases 
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy 
previously articulated in the Court's decisions. 
The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited 
right of this kind in the past. 
We therefore conclude that the right of personal 
privacy includes the abortion decision, but that 
this right is not unqualified and must be considered 
against important state interests. . . . 
The same day the Supreme Court struck down Danforth's 
husband veto statute, it refused to invalidate on its face a 
statute that provided for a judicial balancing of the facts and 
circumstances in which a minor desires to obtain an abortion 
without parental consent. Rather, it directed the lower court to 
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get more information about whether the judicial proceedings would 
protect the minor's rights. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 
(Bellotti I) (1976). 
Bellotti I observed that a statute preferring parental 
consent was acceptable, so long as the minor could reasonably 
obtain an order permitting the abortion without consent where 
she shows herself capable of giving informed consent, and that to 
do so without parental permission would be in her best interest. 
428 U.S. at 145. Accord, Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 
U.S. 622 (1979) [grounded in an individual judicial determination 
on a case by case basis]. 
In the case of Doe v. Smith the facts were almost 
identical to this case. Certiorari was denied at 108 S.Ct. 2136 
(1988) . Justice Stevens seemed to note that one reason for 
denial was that the balancing had already been performed by the 
Indiana trial court, which had found in favor of the mother. See 
108 S.Ct. at 2137. Justice Stevens did not state whether the 
trial court was in error in performing such a balancing. 
Issues which might be considered in a balancing approach 
were used in the lower court in Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 
(Ind. 1988), Pivarnik, J. dissenting, cert. den. 109 S.Ct. 391 
(1988) . Those included the effect on the spouses of a ruling one 
way or the other, circumstances of the parties, specifics of the 
pregnancy, opinions of doctors, etc. 
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The balancing approach fits naturally into a divorce 
action, as this one was. 
This case arises from the attempt of a trial judge 
to make a decision involving one of the issues 
presented in a dissolution case in which he had full 
jurisdiction over all issues arising from and 
involved in the marriage relationship of these two 
people. It falls on him to hear the facts and apply 
the law to make a distribution of the parties1 
property and to provide for the care, custody and 
support of the minor children. In so doing he can 
place the custody of the child with either party. . 
. . A finding that the wife conceives, even in the 
first trimester, fixes a responsibility on the 
husband to care for that child. . . . It is in-
comprehensible to me that this same trial court is 
foreclosed from even considering the question of 
whether the wife should be permitted to destroy this 
creation of both parties in the marital relationship 
merely because she wants to. At least up to now, no 
right has been determined to be absolute. Every 
right must yield and respond to rights of others. 
526 N.E.2d at 962, Pivarnik, J. dissenting. 
Neither the father's interest in bringing the pregnancy to 
term nor that of the mother in terminating it has been declared 
to be absolute and cancel out the other. "The balance of these 
two rights, each of such a sensitive nature and personal nature, 
is, as I see it, the real task confronting the court." Doe v. 
Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 138 (Mass. 1974), Reardon, J. dissenting. 
Justice Reardon pointed out that the mother's interests, while 
significant, were largely temporary. 
The mother opposes a balancing test, because she seeks an 
absolute right. 
It is one thing to emancipate women from discrim-
ination and male tyranny; it is quite another to 
emancipate them from all human claims and 
obligations toward the rights of others. But to 
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claim or presume an absolute right to abortion or to 
make 'women's rights' absolute is to create a set of 
rights for women subject to none of the normal 
limitations of life in human community. 
Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality, 464 (1970). No 
authority gives her such an absolute right. And no one stands in 
a better position to test the limits of the abortion right in a 
fair hearing than the father and husband. If he had no rights 
that can, under any circumstances, outweigh those of his wife, 
abortion on demand would be absolute after all. It is not. See, 
e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 
388 (1981). 
X. Roe v. Wade should be narrowed. 
The mother is concerned that authority has been used to 
indicate that Roe v. Wade may be overturned soon. While this is 
the case, and the father's hope, it is not necessary for him 
to ask that any controlling case be reversed. As 
indicated above, the limits of the abortion right are not fully 
defined. The authority cited in the father's opening brief to 
indicate Roe's strength is waning illustrates that its bounds 
are being (and should be) restricted, not expanded. 
The days of knee-jerk negative reactions to even the least 
restriction on the abortion right are long gone. The Court could 
as easily point find the father's rights consistent with Roe v. 
Wade, Danforth and other cases, as to overturn them. 
- 21 -
XI. Pees should be awarded to the father, not the mother. 
The mother has asked that she be awarded her attorney fees 
on appeal against the father, Brief p. 30, again based upon 
facts not in the record. The apparent basis for her request is 
need. That is not a criterion for attorney fees on appeal under 
R. Utah Ct. App. 33. The Court may award costs and attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party if it finds the appeal frivolous or 
brought for delay. Eames v. Eames, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 
(Utah App. 1987) [where evidence was mischaracterized]. 
Even if capacity to pay were considered to determine the 
attorney fee issue, the mother would not be entitled to an award 
in this case. She points out that both parties have low income. 
Brief p. 30. But she fails to mention that her counsel is acting 
as "Attorneys for defendant and the American Civil Liberties 
Union." Resp. Brief Ex. D p. 6. It is disturbing for the mother 
to request reimbursement of fees (based on need) without 
disclosing whether she is responsible for or paying those fees, 
and the extent to which she is assisted by the ACLU. The 
father's support has consisted of $1,000 received from National 
Right to Life, hardly enough to cover out of pocket costs. 
Either fees should be born by each party, or the mother 
should be required to pay the father's. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to restore the father's rights, so a 
remand would profit little. The mother aborted the parties1 
fetus, even though the father's counsel had declared in open 
court his intention to go immediately to this Court for a similar 
order. Apparently she believed she had done so during the narrow 
window of opportunity between Judge Young's oral dissolution of 
the temporary restraining order and Presiding Judge Garff's 
ruling, less than an hour later, again restraining the abortion. 
Actually the abortion occurred after the order was entered, but 
allegedly without notice of the order. 
Since the child is gone the father merely seeks an order 
declaring that the trial court was in error not to balance the 
private rights and interests of the parties to determine whether 
to issue a permanent injunction against aborting the child. 
The father requests a recognition that he has rights, and 
that the mother's rights are not limitless. Such a holding would 
he entirely consistent with Roe v. Wade, Danforth and all other 
decisions of controlling jurisdictions. 
To hold for the mother would further a sex bias, as stated 
in the father's opening brief. 
Finally, the Court should strike or disregard the mother's 
brief, and award attorney fees to the father as a consequence of 
the misuse of facts. 
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Respectfully so requested this twenty-fourth day of 
February, 1989. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Evan R. Hurst 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the twenty-fourth day of February, 
1989, I caused four copies of the foregoing to be hand delivered 
or mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq, 
Michael S. Evans, Esq. 
Julie A. Bryan, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
and for American Civil Liberties Union 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
ORDER DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Evan R. Hurst, # 5091 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801)486-9636 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
Civil No. D-88-944 
Judge David S. Young 
On March 30, 1988, the above Court, with the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding, based upon an Order to Show Cause 
previously issued, heard the request of plaintiff that the Order 
temporarily restraining defendant from having an abortion be 
made a permanent injunction. Plaintiff appeared and was 
represented by Mitchell R. Barker and Evan R. Hurst. Defendant, 
by leave of the Court, did not appear but was represented by 
Michael S. Evans of the Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake City. 
David S. Dolowitz, also appeared, appearing on behalf of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and defendant. Argument was 
heard, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Temporary Restraining Order previously 
issued be immediately dissolved and that no permanent 
injunction issue. 
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